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This article begins with the premise that self-imagery is constituted 
as a shape-shifting aggregate of symbolic systems that incorporates 
the human body itself as one ofits representations. At intermittent 
points of the body's embodiment of visual cultute and tacit 
social experience, alternative representations accrete into varying 
symbolic systems, the multiple shapes a self-image may take over a 
lifetime. Given that social identity is derived from the interaction 
of various symbolic systems, how do some bodies and self-
images come to be taken as that of identities incompatible with 
most others? In this exploration of the self-image and identity, 
the author reconsiders the purposes of art education in human 
development, especially when the self-image is given primacy over 
the objects we typically plan to make in the classroom. 
Mr. Hooper's Store 
I have a vivid memory of watching "Sesame Street" segments 
when I was little, where Susan or Bob or Gordon or Mr. Hooper 
would sing a variation of the categorization song that includes the 
lines, "One of these things is not like the other," or "One of these 
groups just doesn't belong here." This was in the early 1970s. I was 
being bussed to school in a White neighborhood, caught up in the 
nation's movement to address the social injustice of the unequal 
quality of schooling in ghettoes like the one I grew up in, located in a 
Brooklyn neighborhood called Crown Heights. It was eerie listening 
to these songs, watching little White boys and girls and little Black 
boys and girls sitting together in Mr. Hooper's store while no one 
addressed the giant blue furry elephant right there in the storefront 
with them. Even as a youngster, I was very much aware that most 
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people had long been quite comfortable with the idea that the kids 
sitting at Mr. Hooper's counter did not truly belong together. Even 
I knew that this was reason for the absence of White bodies on my 
narrow block in Brooklyn, and the absence of Black bodies anywhere 
near the wide lawns of homes in Sheepshead Bay. But this idea-the 
idea of different categories of bodies and of bodies that belong and 
do not belong-has generated many other stories worth noting. 
Scientific and Narrative Traits 
Science tells me that bodies have physical traits, distinguishing 
characteristics that can be named, labeled, or categorized, and which 
are reproduced and passed along genetically from one generation to 
the next. So when, during the last week of June, I was diagnosed by 
a physician as showing symptoms of the onset of diabetes mellitus, I 
was also asked whether either of my parents had diabetes. The answer 
was yes, my father, who died of diabetes-related complications at age 
63. 
Storytelling tells me that physical bodies also have narrative 
traits, distinguishing characteristics that can be named, labeled, 
or categorized, and which are also represented and passed along 
genetically from one generation to the next. For instance, in 
elementary school there was Thomas, seemingly always behind 
me on the schoolbus, who I allowed the minor social infraction of 
thumbing and rubbing the frizz of my hair, massaging the scalp of 
a quality of head clearly alien to his friendly white fingertips. This 
became mildly embarrassing in that I had never before truly embodied 
the representation of my hair texture as unlike the others. In high 
school, there was David, who pointed out that the skin on each of my 
knuckles, skin genetically thicker than his, was crinkled and scored 
in a manner that reminded him mostly of a reptile, a texture clearly 
alien to his friendly brown eyes. This was quite embarrassing in that 
I had never before embodied the representation that my skin texture 
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was not like the others. Embarrassment, or tacit bodily awareness, is 
an indication that social stigma has been embodied. 
I have a story I must tell, one that tells something significant 
about art education and its place in the world, a story told most 
simply through personal narrative. First-person explanations-"the 
life story that people themselves tell about who they are, and why" 
(Carey, 2007, ~ I)-are a useful research tool, especially as researchers 
become more confident that "narrative themes are, as much as any 
other trait, driving factors in people's behavior" (~ 12). This story 
begins with the following question: As I reviewed the literature for 
my dissertation, an effort to generate new knowledge in the field of 
art education, why was I drawn to the work of scholars like Simi 
Linton (1998) and Erving Coffman (1963), scholars who are central 
to the field of Disability Studies, when neither the art education or 
disability studies fields are quite like the other? 
Convergences, Negations, and the Interaction of Categories 
All research communicates stories, or the paradigms that support 
those stories. The story I wish to tell today came to the surface of my 
consciousness through a series of convergences as I began to conceive 
this article. On the eve of my start in the role as chair of the Art 
Education Department, I had been asking myself why art education 
is so irrelevant to so many, and so misunderstood in so many circles. 
Frankly, even as I have dedicated my life to professing its significance 
to me, art education as taught by art education professionals was 
non-existent in my elementary and middle school years. Why isn't 
art education included in the same category as reading, writing, and 
arithmetic as one of the essentials of a good education? Why isn't art 
education like the others? 
Why are students of color overwhelmingly pathologized as a 
special education population in public schools? Disability studies 
scholar David]. Connor (2008) cites the work of scholars within 
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the field of Disability Studies who do not view impairments as 
"medicalized deficits (physical, sensory, emotional, or intellectual)," 
but rather "as natural human differences categorized as 'disabilities' by 
a society reticent to reorganize through the removal of barriers and 
restrictions" to those who are different (Connor, 2008, p. 452, my 
italics). In the identification of students to receive special education 
services, ''African-Americans are three times as likely to receive 
the label of mental retardation and twice as likely to be labeled 
emotionally disturbed in comparison to Whites" (Connor, 2008, p. 
458). 
I saw a glimpse of this phenomenon firsthand in the aftermath 
of a Sunday service as I observed the 6-year-old son of a friend 
at my church. The child's parents were in the music ministry, his 
father a drummer. As was his habit, the young boy had climbed 
behind the drums after the service and was playing them intently, 
auto didactically focused on keeping exact rhythm with a couple 
of the musicians still fingering the keyboard and the bass guitar. 
Having worked with children identified as gifted for many years at 
Hunter College Elementary School, I knew some of the signs and 
mentioned them casually to his parents. It turns out that they had 
suspected their son's giftedness ever since he had begun speaking in 
full sentences unusually early in his development. Months later, I had 
a second conversation with his mother. She related her frustrations 
with acts of social determinism apparent in the school her son had 
recently been attending. The teachers there had already labeled her 
son, only in kindergarten, 'a problem child' who was in need of 
special attention because of all his kinetic energy, the kind of energy 
any percussionist is sure to exude from time to time. When the 
child's mother countered that she believed her son was gifted, the 
incredulous retort was, "Well, who told you that?" The implication 
was that if the school's professionals had not declared the boy to be 
gifted, it could not be so. This boy was one of the very few Black 
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children in a predominantly White school. Why aren't Black boys 
included in the same category as those taken for granted as able-
bodied, able-minded, and normal? Why aren't Black boys and girls 
like the others? 
Senator Joseph Biden, at the start of his campaign for the 2008 
Democratic presidential primary, felt it appropriate to distinguish 
one of his competitors, Senator Barack Obama, as follows: "I mean, 
you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and 
bright and clean and a nice-looking guy. I mean, that's a storybook, 
man" (Tapper, 2007). Now I will admit here that I have long held 
insecurities about my personal ability to speak in the greater public 
arena, probably due to the invisibility in the media of other folks 
who looked like me addressing the ''American'' public. But there 
have always been articulate, bright, clean, and nice-looking leaders 
in Black communities. Why aren't the many Black leaders from my 
neighborhood illuminated in the national and international media 
and included in the same category as those taken for granted as 
mainstream, articulate, bright, clean, nice-looking? Why aren't Black 
men and women like the others? 
I recently rented the movie "Miss Evers' Boys," a 1997 HBO 
film. It tells of a clinical study gone awry, the infamous Tuskegee 
Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, which was conducted 
under the auspices of the U.S. Public Health Service from 1932 
through 1972. In this 40 year study, the longest non-therapeutic 
scientific experiment on human beings in medical history, 600 
African-American sharecroppers were studied in Macon County, 
Alabama-399 chronic syphilitics and a control group of 201 men 
without syphilis-under a ruse that deceived the participants into 
believing that were indeed being treated for what was known in the 
vernacular as "bad blood." Placebo treatments, medical hyperbole, 
and promises offuneral benefits were all plied in the place of informed 
consent. Long after penicillin had become the standard and effective 
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treatment for syphilis, the men who were recruited as human guinea 
pigs during this effort to watch the natural progression of this fatal 
disease, lived and died without ever being informed that they were 
not being treated for anything at all. How could this take place? 
Easily-this study took place in an era when the lives of the Black 
men, women, and children, if valued at all, were certainly not valued 
the same as those who were White. 
In fact, the prevailing definition was that of the utter abnormality 
of the descendants of slaves as was declaimed by Samuel Chapman 
Armstrong, founder of the Hampton Normal and Agricultural 
Institute in 1868 for the manual training of colored people. 
Armstrong was of the opinion that his charges were mentally, morally, 
and materially destitute, each one burdened with the unfortunate 
affiiction of a number of birth defects issuing forth in the form 
of "[h]is low ideas of life and duty, his weak conscience, his want 
of energy and thrift," and "his indolent, sensuous tropical blood" 
(Kliebard, 1999, p. 14). The long-prevailing prescription of an 
education appropriate for a Negro was explicated by John Dollard in 
his expose of a Southern town in the 1930s where schools were used 
"to educate the Negro in order to fit him for place first as a slave and 
then as a caste man in society," an educational trajectory that would 
"prepare him for, but not beyond, the opportunities of lower-class 
status" (Kliebard, 1999, p. 224). These words and institutions and 
the ideas they represent have become a part of the layering of Black 
self-image. Why aren't the bodies of Black laborers included in the 
same category as those taken for granted as valuable, non-defective, 
and worth the investment of social capital? Why aren't Black bodies 
like the others? 
I happened across a television interview with popular journalist 
and author Malcolm Gladwell (2005), author of the book Blink: 
The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, in which he explores rapid 
cognition, "the sort of snap decision-making performed without 
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thinking about how one is thinking, faster and often more correctly 
than the logical part of the brain can manage" (Lasser, 2007, ~ 2). 
In the course of the interview, Gladwell-who could pass as White 
in many circles even though one of his parents is Jamaican-related 
the phenomenon of snap judgments to how pejorative stereotypes 
are assigned, citing Harvard's Implicit Association Test, and the fact 
that ever since he let his hair grow out into a prominent afro, he has 
been stopped by police while traveling about in what seem to be snap 
decisions by those authorities and certainly without just cause. Why 
isn't Black hair like the others? 
Finally, on a recent episode of the Oprah show a long-standing 
crisis in self-image and identity was revisited as Black children were 
asked to categorize their preferences and distastes for White baby 
dolls that don't look like them and Black baby dolls that do in Kiri 
Davis's eight-minute documentary, ''A Girl Like Me." One of several 
young ladies who were also interviewed in the video expresses near 
the end how "Everybody else in society is throwing their ideas and 
what they believe we should be at us [sic]." Why aren't the self-images 
of Blacks included in the same category as those taken for granted 
as valuable, central to the popular culture, and worth opening up all 
media avenues and opportunities for Blacks to self-promote? Why 
aren't Black self-images and self-esteem like the others? 
Identity as Reinterpretation 
The previous convergences are just starting points. Ultimately, 
I am interested in the intersectionality of all self-images in an 
Information Age, not just Black self-image. In a May 10,2007, New 
York Times website multimedia presentation about a new exhibition 
at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture in Harlem 
called "Stereotypes vs. Humantypes," images featuring Blacks in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were displayed revealing how 
Widespread stereotyped and distorted representations of Blacks were 
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during that time period ("Fact vs. Fiction," 2007). But the exhibition 
also showcases a concurrent phenomenon that was almost invisible 
and is still for the most part unknown: images that sketched the 
undistorted, uncaricatured life of Blacks at home, in weddings, at 
play-images of common everyday life in opposition to multiple 
social and scientific discourses declaiming Black abnormality and 
pathology-images reiterated and reappearing in the old photos in 
shoeboxes, in the corners of cracked dresser drawers, in crumbling 
envelopes on closet shelves, in heavy attic trunks, in frames adorning 
faded wallpaper. What can we learn from this? If nothing else, I 
believe we can relearn the purpose of art education if we take a new 
look at the reinterpretation of Mrican American identity that took 
place in the midst of centuries of visual cultural vilification, a perfect 
storm of imagery that told only of our ugliness and unacceptability 
in the world. This reinterpretation was worked through the arts 
surrounding the Harlem Renaissance as much as it was anyplace else 
(Harris, 2003; Willis, 2000). 
All educators ought to celebrate any group's ability to visibly 
reinterpret personal and social significance. What if the ranks of 
art educators were charged with developing the human ability to 
def)r disparaging labels and expectations and to lead meaningful and 
transforming lives in spite of the persistent social will to stigmatize? 
What if art educators were to take up the charge of opening up 
curricular spaces for students to locate personal significance for 
themselves, along with the agency to change the signifiers they have 
thus far embodied? To paraphrase one of the catchphrases from the 
popular new television show Heroes, "Save the self-image, save the 
world." 
Self-imagery as a Symbol System 
The conception of the self as an instrument of inquiry has 
birthed whole new branches of qualitative inquiry (Eisner, 1991). 
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However, the self is not a form in itself, but a shape-shifting arena of 
possibilities bounded and overwritten by a palimpsest of self-images 
making sense over and over again of our experience of the world. 
A reading of the self is complicated with arrays of diaphanous self-
images, an archaeological layering of "verbal images" and "mental 
images." As it signifies an aspect of self, a "verbal image" is a name; 
if a "word is an image of an idea, and an idea is an image of a thing" 
(Mitchell, 1986, p. 22), then a name is simply an image of a proposed 
identity, not dissimilar from a label, category, or stereotype, none of 
which are necessarily true or even apt. Yet once applied, a name, 
label, category, or stereotype becomes a part of the archaeology of 
self-imagery, a part of the emerging story. 
A "mental image" of self is akin to the narrative of personal 
memory, images of the self held in mind that have been impressed 
on us by the experience of our selves as reflected back to us in our 
passage through the world (Mitchell, 1986, p. 22). To explain further, 
philosopher David Hume is cited as describing the remnants left after 
memory's dynamic process of minimization both as "faint images" 
and "decayed sensation" (Mitchell, 1986, p. 23). Thus, a memory 
is a selective remnant of an experience, a motion picture dissolve, a 
glancing recollection of texture, an echo, a whiff of a scent, packed 
with dense, continuous meaning. Every memory is a symbol. Every 
self-image is in vertiginous alignment with a deeper archaeology 
of identity, that is to say, a multiformational arrangement of 
representations that is manifested in the visual culture, a construction 
that tells who you are like and who you are not like, hybridic at 
times, subliminal at times, always interactional, all images contesting 
for preeminence and position in the constitution of a larger story of 
identity, the story of who I am and of who we be. 
While some may understand identity as an immutable text, I 
see identity as the gaps in the deterministic text, the possibilities that 
redress our certainties and our destinies, the parts of the story that 
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cannot be scripted because they are still being contested, because 
they have not yet been lived. For those who rail against inappropriate 
names and unwanted self-images, there is a danger and there is a 
hope. Identity tantalizingly presents itself intact and may then be 
immediately overwritten, either as an act of malicious or indifferent 
subjugation, or as an act of self-preservation. According to Julia 
Kristeva, "a text works by absorbing and destroying at the same time 
the other texts of the intertextual space" (cited in Marshall, 1992, p. 
130). Identity can thus be understood as an ongoing interpretation, 
pertaining to whatever experience holds true for those situated within 
their particular context-boundedness (Eisner, 1991). In writing 
on the act of interpretation, Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor 
(1976) suggests that there are multiple phenomena that, although 
not text, are analogous to text in that we treat them as the objects of 
our interpretation: 
Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt 
to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object 
must, therefore, be a text, or a text-analogue, which in some way 
is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory-in 
one way or another, unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to 
light an underlying coherence or sense. (p. 153) 
Our self-images do not reconstitute facts about us. What is a 
fact? It is a thing that is incontestably the case. In the realm of 
law, a fact is the purported truth about a case as opposed to any 
interpretation of said facts. However, if you, like me, have ever had 
difficulty relating the facts about a particular situation, have you ever 
fully considered why that is? It is because you have not yet generated 
an interpretation of the interacting facts, events, and emotions 
surrounding that particular situation-you haven't yet formed it 
into a story. Our representations of the world we know and of what 
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we do aren't based on facts-they are founded on our needs, on our 
desires, on our hopes, on our beliefs, on our desperation, on our 
shaping of some oasis of order out of the chaos. We are compelled 
to give life a shape. In other words, the facts that populate our 
histories are meaningless in and of themselves until someone renders 
those facts significant by interpreting them. A truth held dear always 
begins by sorting disparate facts into a re-cognizable relationship, a 
story we will be able to recall, remember, and relate to others. The 
truths we hold dear are, thus, interpretations. We go even further 
to make art and discourse and imagery of those interpretations by 
exaggerating the things we hold most significant, embellishing the 
things that mesmerize, distract, and hold our attention, heightening 
the saliencies that texture our existence. Ironically, our facility at 
shaping variations of truth around the very same facts makes any 
interpretation of facts highly contestable. 
Our self-images are variations in an ongoing and embodied and 
personal story; thus, they are malleable. Self-image, like memory, can 
be erased by time or modified as facts are forgotten or misremembered · 
over time. Self-image can be contorted by falsehoods or accusations. 
Self-image can be invaded by trauma or brain lesion. Self-image can be 
altogether disconnected from factuality and be reinforced by fictional 
episodes or fantasies. Self-image can be recalled by alternative cues, 
and be remembered in emotional keys varying from the discordant 
to the melodious. For instance, on a day full of embarrassments 
that assault the mind and stresses that expose the body, self-imagery 
might represent itself with fits of visceral self-loathing. Yet, on a day 
when the mind and body are stroked with a sense of belonging, self-
imagery will shape itself at rest in a harbor connecting it to all the trade 
routes on the social map. An individual's archaeology of self-imagery 
IS a story-in-progress. The story is intuitively told, proceeding "from 
everything we know and everything we are;" the story is improvised, 
and as with all improvisations, converges "on the moment from a 
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rich plurality of directions and sources" (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 
40). 
Symbolic Interaction 
So how do we as art educators "save the self-image?" How do 
we "save the world" from the contemporary crisis in self-image? 
Postmodernist assumptions view identity constructs as narrative 
admixtures spoken in polyphonous sign systems, "a multiplicity 
of ironic and conflicting interdependent voices that can only be 
understood contextually, ironically, relationally, and politically" 
(Slattery, 2001, p. 374). Does this really have anything to do with 
art education at all? What if I told you that my job description as an 
art educator has never been to teach students to make pretty pictures 
and things, or the history of pretty pictures and things, or how to 
perceive when a picture or thing is pretty, or how to persuade others 
of the prettiness of a picture or thing in words that are captivatingly 
pretty? 
I submit that my job as an art educator is actually much simpler 
than this; it only has three moving parts. My job is first to open up 
curricular spaces where students can picture themselves in the world, 
no matter whether that picture is pretty or not, locating self-image 
along with the agency to reinterpret the signifiers they have thus far 
embodied; secondly, my job is to open up a space where students can 
picture a more just and refined world, critiquing the cultural stories 
we hold to be socially significant or insignificant and exercising their 
acquired agency to make changes along the way; thirdly, my job is 
to open up a space where students can practice and expand upon a 
repertoire of marks, movements, and modelings that will make visible 
the self-imagery and stories that they have rendered to be personally 
and socially significant, capturing the attention of others so that they 
too may see, share the vision, and find common meaning. 
Michael Parsons (1992) cites Charles Taylor's suggestion that 
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anything interpretable must be a text or text-analogue. Interpretable 
events are the stuff that constitute the aggregate site ofidentity. What 
we see, hear, and emotionally experience, becomes us. Identities 
then may be viewed as semiotic creations, the archaeology of which 
is expanded by each ensuing reinterpretation. Identities are signs. 
Umberto Eco (1976) writes that, "A sign is everything which can be 
taken as significantly substituting for something else" (p. 7). 
Identity is a meta-symbol, a by-product of the symbolic systems 
of verbal and mental imagery by which we construct or re-construct 
our version of the world. Walter Truett Anderson (1997) claims that 
"personal identities would be hard to locate without the network of 
symbols within which we are defined and the internal monologue 
with which we continually remind ourselves who we think we 
are" (p. 263). As a meta-symbol composed of sub-archaeologies 
of self-imagery, an identity is a living text. Identities are also then 
intertextual. Brenda Marshall, citing a definition of intertextuality 
by Jacques Derrida, describes a system ofinterrelationships "between 
the psyche, society, [and] the world" (Marshall, 1992, p. 122). 
In the field of sociology, the term symbolic interactionism refers 
to "the theory that the meaning of symbols is determined through 
the Course of human interaction" ("Symbolic interactionism," 2007, 
~ 1). According to a Wikipedia article, Herbert Blumer (1969) set 
forth the major tenets of symbolic interactionism as follows: 
1. "Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings 
that the things have for them" 
2. "The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, 
the social interaction that one has with one's fellows" 
3. "These meanings are handled in, and, modified through, an 
interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things 
he/she encounters" 
With the interaction of symbolic systems in mind, reclaiming 
the relevance of art education necessarily involves a rethinking of 
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art education. If we rethink art education, we must also rethink our 
approach to the objectives of the art education curriculum. Focusing 
for a moment on my job description to open up curricular spaces 
where students can picture themselves as critical agents in the world, 
I would argue that traditional art educational curriculum planning 
clogs up the spaces to extend and deepen self-imagery with its jump-
cut, object-centered focus-make a little bit of pottery, then a few 
prints, then some observational drawings, then a painting or two, 
with a little bit of jewelry making or some digital photography, if we 
can squeeze it in. There is little attempt to facilitate the construction 
of extended personal narratives as rendered by our students, through 
curricular sequences that engender new self-imagery and new 
installments in the continuum of our collective story. 
If "human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings 
that the things have for them," why not allow students to work in 
the media they hold most significant, elaborating on the subjects 
they identify as being most significant to them irrespective of our 
professional teacherly desires? Educators need only to mark out 
the widest possible thematic parameters and allow students to find 
their way to the specificity they desire. Youngsters have no difficulty 
finding the stories they want to tell or re-tell; all we need to do is 
give them the permission to fill in the gaps of their choice. The 
major adjustment for educators is to no longer think in terms of 
class projects, but rather in terms of individual projects. 1his will 
be more work for us in some ways and less work in other senses as 
the individuals in our classrooms and studios are given the license to 
interact with each other and with us as independent agents on their 
projects, in keeping with Blumer's (1969) assertion that the meaning 
of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction 
that one has with one's fellows. 
In Jane Gooding-Brown's (2000) examination of the social 
construction of self and difference, and the negotiation of established 
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interpretations as an agency for change, she argues that a disruptive 
model of interpretation can initiate incursions that reposition story 
values. Robert McKee (1997) defines a story's values as the "qualities 
of human experience that may shift from positive to negative, or 
negative to positive, from one moment to the next" (p. 34). One could 
say that the great efficiency of disruptive discursive repositioning is 
the ability to alter a story not by attaching an amendment to the story, 
but rather by infiltrating the story sequence and flipping the polarity, 
so to speak, of definitive events already ensconced in the narrative. 
The authorities have no defense against it. It is through the agency to 
alternate the currents of their lives that the meanings most significant 
to our students are "handled," "modified," and reinterpreted. Agency 
is conceived here not as the "freedom to do whatever the subject wills 
but rather freedom to constitute oneself in an unexpected manner-
to decode and recode one's identity (Stinson, 2004, p. 57). 
Our bodies and bodies of knowledge are evidentiary. They 
are documentary. We position these bodies to tell stories-to tell 
histories, sometimes slightly false, sometimes barely true, but 
always significant enough to marshal our attention. Some wield the 
power to trap bodies in names, labels, categories, or stereotypes. 
Sometimes we must reposition our bodies to save our lives and 
liberate our self-images. Somehow, in the years succeeding the great 
Harlem Renaissance literary reinterpretation designated as 'the New 
Negro,' the old broken, whipped and degraded Negro body was 
also reinterpreted as a document of strength and beauty, yet no less 
Black! These were reinterpretations that altered the visual culture of 
"Am erica," connoting humanity rather than monstrosity. 
In the music video from the 2001 song "Who We Be," rap star 
DMX questions whether or not the dominant culture really knows 
who he, or any African American for that matter, really is. At several 
points in the video, brilliantly directed by Korean American Joseph 
Kahn, the rapper's body is digitally recoded, his image repositioning 
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itself, a floating signifier interacting throughout social history, caught 
up in the visual cultural drama of "America's" most significant events 
and the rapper's most salient surroundings, events that, in truth, are 
already subsumed within the archaeology of DMX's self-imagery. 
Ultimately, D MX appears to conclude that who he is is not at all 
bound up in difference, but that he could be just as well represented 
by anyone of the number of children, each of unspecified ethnic 
origin, who identify themselves in his stead in the closing seconds 
of the video. Likewise, each of those children could be just as well 
represented by the final image of DMX himself in the concluding 
frame; DMX and the children are intersectionalities, alternating 
currents for one another's self-image. DMX cannot be held behind 
prison bars that tell him he is not like the others. 
Art educators, take note: the question, "Who am I?" posed by 
an inquiring and creative mind is likely the most powerful thing we 
have going for us as we decide who we be as teaching professionals in 
the 21 st century. 
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